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I. Preface 
During my university years, as I was mostly immersed in the Hungarian-Bosnian battles 
(1404–1408) and investigating their background in the era of Sigismund, I realized that a 
number of questions and issues are still open concerning the protection of the southern border, 
as well as regarding the battles waged for the solution of the Ottoman problem. It is not a 
question of researchers being indifferent to early Hungarian-Ottoman battles, only that a 
comprehensive review was yet to come. Several prominent historians did research on specific 
sections of the era between 1389 and 1401, but so far a compressive overview and an annual 
breakdown was not completed.            
Pál ENGEL published the first four years of the Hungarian-Ottoman war for the years 
between 1389 and 1392 but did not continue the year-by-year summary of events. However, 
such a sequel would have been justified, if only for the Christian crusade of 1396 and the 
Battle of Nicopolis as its closure. The relevant sources available also reveal several important 
details, such as the date when western crusaders arrived in Buda, or the records for compiling 
a catalogue of the known Hungarian crusaders.       
 
II. Premises and Structure of the Dissertation 
When structuring the dissertation, I attempted to achieve transparency and a description of the 
so far unknown events of the Hungarian-Ottoman battles, all the while focusing on and 
emphasizing the findings of the research. 
I discuss the above topics in eight chapters. In the first chapter, I examine the 
relationship from 1389 between the states lying south of the border of the Kingdom of 
Hungary, describing the internal and external challenges that a young Sigismund of 
Luxembourg and his country was facing. The second chapter discusses the direct impact of 
the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman-Slav devastation along the southern border, its effects and 
the military events it generated as a response from the Hungarians. The third chapter 
describes the route of the crusader army, recruited for the year 1396, marching to the castle of 
Nicopolis. Following the arrival of the western contingent to Buda, I examine our current 
understanding of the crusaders’ movements (both western and Hungarian) within the 
Kingdom of Hungary in light of the available sources, with special reference to the 
whereabouts of King Sigismund and to the reasons thereof. The same chapter also discusses 
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Wallachia (Havasföld in Hungarian) as the ancillary theatre of the 1396 military campaign 
and the “smaller” crusader army marching therein.           
The following chapters focus on the Christian crusade and on the Battle of Nicopolis. 
In the fourth chapter, I concentrate on the events of the Battle of Nicopolis. In the subsequent 
fifth chapter I have compiled a catalogue of Hungarians participating in the crusade of 1396 
and the Battle of Nicopolis. I further discuss the numbers of the Crusader and Ottoman armies 
facing each other on the battlefield.     
The southern defence operations following the Battle of Nicopolis are discussed in 
Chapter 7, along with a summary and analysis of the military events in the Czech and 
Moravian territories in the North, in as much detail as justified by the events. In the eight 
chapter I discuss the methods and variations of border defence against the Ottomans in the 
south. I also discuss the role of the comes (count) of Timiș County (Temes in Hungarian), 
which increasingly gained significance and influence in the defence as made necessary by the 
events. In the last chapter I provide a brief chronology of military events between 1389 and 
1401, primarily in the south but also in some other directions, complete with the parameters 
required for describing the military event in question and a list of people known from the 
sources. The subsequent appendix includes a map to help understand various sections of the 
paper.      
 
III. Main Findings 
The foremost subject matter of the dissertation is the response given by the Kingdom of 
Hungary to the issues related to the appearance of the Ottoman Empire along its borders. This 
proved to be a complex task after 1389. Solutions had to be found simultaneously for 
defending against raids from the south that were becoming an everyday nuisance, to the 
infiltration of Ottoman diplomacy into Hungarian spheres of interest, to its strengthening, and 
to preventing its armed expansion.    
    I would caution against equating border operations with military campaigns. Border 
operations were considered a catch-all phrase in those times. The protection and defence of 
the nether territories/brinks mentioned in the sources arguably had diverse resources. We may 
define it as the armed troops of the bans and counts, which basically imply a constant 
presence, or we may ascribe it to troops that arrived at the king’s orders. Their primary task 
was to annihilate the enemy before it reaches the Hungarian border, thereby avoiding the 
destruction of the surrounding counties and them becoming a battlefield. To that end, as 
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recounted by some sources, military campaigns with varying numbers of Hungarian troops 
and varying objectives intruded into Bosnian and Serb territories. Of course, Ottoman-Slav 
groups with a small number of troops moving quickly and applying raid-type warfare often 
managed to infiltrate Hungarian territories from their Northern Bosnian or Northern Serbian 
base. As a best-case scenario, Hungarian forces succeeded in halting and annihilating them 
near the border, while in worse cases they left the Kingdom with devastation behind and 
taking the loot, including several women and children that were meant to be slaves.                  
 
 The following answers can be established as responses to the hypotheses outlined at 
the beginning of the paper.  
 
1. 
Handling and averting the Ottoman threat along the border required constant border 
protection. This was the only partial remedy against the infiltration of Ottoman irregular 
armies attacking at random intervals and with unpredictable force.    
From the research we can establish that protection of the southern regions of the 
kingdom was best accomplished, to a varying degree, by “constant” border protection. This 
type of border protection was based on two concepts: one was the elimination of enemy 
Ottoman units managing to cross into the territory of the kingdom; the other method was to 
infiltrate the states near the border. The latter was presumably the same type of raid as 
practiced by the Ottomans. Available sources provide evidence for both methods. Still, the 
most difficult task is to reconstruct these events, given that the information on the attacks and 
any neutralization thereof is few and fragmented. In many cases, it can only be established 
that the event took place, but resources do not mention its date or exact location. Therefore, 
the efficacy of defences can not be ascertained either, but it is fair to say that it was not 
hermetic.     
 
2. 
Defence was mostly assigned to the bans of Dalmatia-Croatia, Slavonia and Macsó, and to 
the count of Temes (“Comes Temesiensis”).   
Research has proved that border protection and patrolling was primarily the task of 
bans near the border, perhaps supplemented by central aid from the king. I believe that due to 
the constant challenges, by this time they functioned as military administration bodies. In 
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addition to the bans of Dalmatia-Croatia, Slavonia and Macsó, the defence of the Hungarian-
Serbian border also had to be organized. The solution provided by Sigismund was the role of 
the comes of Temes and its ongoing fortification.  
Their role was justified by their geographic location, meaning their vicinity to the 
border, and their own interest. The former was important in organizing the defence, since only 
prompt local countermeasures could protect against a swiftly moving enemy. The latter’s 
significance was that the Ottoman raid parties ravaged the territories of these banates and 
stewardships, initiating the depopulation of their counties.      
 
3. 
The southern Hungarian campaign of 1392 can be considered a minor crusader enterprise. It 
shows various similarities in organization and mobilization to the campaign of 1396. The 
enemy was Sultan Bayezid personally, who marched right up to the Hungarian borders to 
consolidate Serbia as a vessel state with a political matrimony. Sigismund wanted to avenge 
the ever-intensifying Ottoman attacks, and he may have learnt about a significant army 
approaching, but he did not believe it was the Sultan’s army lead by Bayezid himself. Initially, 
Sigismund was planning to enter Serbia with his army reinforced with foreign troops, a plan 
which was modified by the presence of the Ottoman Sultan. This also reveals that the 
participants were driven by differing objectives, which is partly why a battle did not take 
place.         
 In respect to the campaign of 1392 we can ascertain its significance among 
Sigismund’s military actions in the previous year. The source material provides no guidance, 
but from the events we can conclude that by this time the Hungarian king was preparing 
against a larger Ottoman unit, possibly an army, but even he was caught unawares by the 
Sultan’s forces. We have insufficient information as to why the decisive battle was avoided. 
Possible reasons may include the differing objectives. Sultan Bayezid was focused on 
strengthening his power in Serbia, while Sigismund deployed against the latest substantial 
attack threatening the southern regions of the kingdom. The parties were unprepared against 
each other. However, the fact that the match between the main forces was postponed does not 
preclude that smaller clashes may have taken place.         
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4. 
The arrival of the leaders of western crusaders to Buda can be ascertained more precisely 
than before, primarily from analysing Sigismund’s journey in Hungary.   
Literature has so far provided various differing accounts, but this anomaly has now 
been successfully resolved with the help of the sources used, meaning that the arrival date of 
western crusaders in Buda is more precise. Assuming that Sigismund personally greeted the 
leaders of the western contingent in Buda, the only task left is to examine the stays of the 
Hungarian king in Buda during 1396 up to the start of the Christian crusade. As per the 
findings, it is reasonable to set the arrival of the leaders of the western contingent sometime in 
early June.   
 
5. 
Building on the experiences of the events of 1392 in the south and on the threats by Sultan 
Bayezid, Sigismund organized the crusader effort of 1396 primarily not as an offensive 
campaign. His aim was more to defend the Kingdom of Hungary, since he counted on the 
Ottoman sultan deploying again as far as to the Hungarian borders.  
The leaders of the western contingent arrived in Buda as early as in the first half of 
June. The date may seem somewhat soon, especially considering that the crusader army only 
began to cross the Danube in mid-August. In the meantime, I believe that Sigismund was 
counting on Bayezid keeping his promise and proceeding to the borders of the kingdom, as he 
did in 1392. For this reason, we cannot exclude that the Hungarian king was playing the long 
game. When the Sultan made no move, it motivated western leaders to take action, that is to 
launch an offensive attack in the spirit of the crusader mentality.    
 
6. 
Ottoman invasions in the south made it necessary to reinforce border protection, as 
mentioned before. This is why the role of the comes of Temes became all the more important, 
and many of those holding the position were granted the title of baron, despite this title not 
being among the main dignities of the country.     
 Undoubtedly one of the legacies of the Ottoman threat was the rising importance of 
the position of the comes of Temes, a process that demonstrably began already before the 
Italian Filippo Scolari (known in Hungarian as Ozorai Pipó). Its role and tasks became clear 
after the mid-1390s, and especially after the lost battle at Nicopolis. Other comites belonging 
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to the comes of Temes covered most of the area along the Hungarian-Serbian border. It was a 
title of trust since many of its holders were favoured subjects of Sigismund. This was 
necessary, too, as the region has only passed the rebellious times of the Horváti mutiny, and 
already had to be militarized against a much more dangerous enemy. And it is true in every 
era that whoever has the arms has the power, and Sigismund had good reason to appoint 
people depending on him not only to the position of Comes Temesiensis, but also as bans in 
Croatia-Dalmatia, Slavonia, and in the Banate of Macsó.            
 
7. 
The main political guideline in the southern region in the 1390s was experimentation. 
Sigismund and his barons strived to systematically overcome the Ottoman problem and to 
that end attempted several different concepts.   
Sigismund and his barons tried to take steps leading to permanent results against the 
Ottomans between 1389 and 1401, be they political or military. The following efforts are 
recorded as attempts at a solution.   
Military actions between 1389 and 1392, considered as attempts at re-pacifying 
Northern Serbia, turned out to be completely hopeless by 1392. Military campaigns related to 
preparing the crusades strategically paid off in the victories in Bosnia in 1394, Moldva in 
1395, and Wallachia in 1395. The largest defeat was the one suffered at the hands of Sultan 
Bayezid at Nicopolis, but we should not underestimate the armed operation against Hervoja 
(Hrvoje) in 1398, either. After its unsuccessful outcome, Hungarian dominion over the 
counties of Orbász, Sana and Dubica was called into question and even lost in some 
territories.        
Despite all their efforts, Sigismund and his barons failed to provide a permanent and 
successful response to the Ottoman threat arising after 1389. The southern policies of the 
kingdom came under pressure, and in spite of appearances, the initiative lay with the 
Ottomans. This is demonstrated by Sigismund leading nine campaigns that were induced, 
directly or indirectly, by the Ottoman problem. A mere three of these campaigns were 
successful, while six ended in failure, including the Christian crusade.    
It is true that the Kingdom of Hungary was unable to provide a successful answer to 
the challenge presented by the Ottoman Empire. It is also true, however, that Sigismund 
recognized the threat from the start and his initial measures laid down the theoretical and 
practical foundation for a defensive system against the Ottomans.    
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